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This paper, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance co-sponsored by the Review
of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments
on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven papers on corporate
governance that were presented in a meeting of the NBER’s corporate governance project. Each of
the papers represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research.
For each of these areas, we discuss the importance of the area and the questions it focuses on, how
the paper in the special issue makes a significant contribution to this area, and what we do and do not
know about the area. We discuss in turn work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors,
executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders, comparative corporate governance, cross-border
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weisbach_2@fisher.osu.eduThis special issue of The Review of Financial Studies presents seven papers that were presented 
at a meeting of the corporate governance project of the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). The papers, which subsequent to the conference went through the usual review process 
of  The Review of Financial Studies, represent cutting-edge research in important areas of 
corporate governance research. This special issue thus provides a good opportunity for taking 
stock of the state of corporate governance research in these areas.  
Interest in corporate governance has been rapidly growing, both inside and outside 
academia, together with recognition of its importance. In the academic world, the interest in 
corporate governance has been truly interdisciplinary, with much work being undertaken by 
researchers not only from economics and finance but also from law, management, and 
accounting. The term “corporate governance” appears as a key word in the abstract of 987 papers 
over the past year on SSRN, and, given the huge amount of research being done in the area, 
SSRN in 2009 started the Corporate Governance Network (CGN) with 21 different subject-
matter electronic journals.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as referring to the way in which 
suppliers of finance assure themselves a return on their investment. Because returns to suppliers 
of finance depend on myriad legal and contractual arrangements, the operation of various 
markets, and the behavior of different types of players, corporate governance has evolved into 
various sub-literatures (e.g., Zingales, 1998; Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003; Hermalin, 2009). 
Below we discuss in turn seven important areas of corporate governance research, each of 
which is represented by a paper in this special issue. For each of these areas, we discuss the 
importance of the area and the questions that it poses for researchers, how the paper in the 
special issue and other recent research advance our understanding of the area, and the questions 
  1that future research may do well to examine. Throughout, we stress questions concerning 
corporate governance that public and private decision-makers face; research that can shed light 
on these questions will have substantial implications and payoffs.  
  Section 1 focuses on shareholders and shareholder activism — the actions that 
shareholders may take to protect their interests. Section 2 focuses on corporate directors, while 
Section 3 turns to executives and their compensation. Whereas Section 1-3 focus on companies 
without a controlling shareholders, Section 4 considers companies with such shareholders. 
Sections 5 and 6 focus on international corporate governance, with Section 5 considering cross-
country comparisons and Section 6 discussing cross-border investments by foreign investors. 
Finally, Section 7 focuses on the political economy of corporate governance.  
  
1. Shareholders  
Berle and Means (1932) identified what appeared to be a fundamental contradiction in the 
corporate form of organization: While dispersed shareholders collectively have incentives to 
monitor the management of the firms for which they own stock, individually, the free-rider 
problem can ruin such incentives, leading to a lack of shareholder involvement in firms. Given 
that the distribution of stock ownership is important because of these free-riding considerations, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) pointed out that large percentage block shareholdings are more 
prevalent in the United States than previously thought (no one doubted their existence outside the 
U.S.). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and many follow-up studies have documented a 
robust empirical relation between these large shareholdings and corporate performance, holding 
in a wide variety of samples spanning a number of countries and time periods. 
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performance are not clear. The main explanation discussed in the Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
article is through the possibility of hostile takeover, because such takeovers can be more 
profitable for a shareholder who already owns a large block of shares than for one who does not 
(see also Grossman and Hart, 1980). Yet, the empirical relation between ownership and 
performance appears to be too robust to be explained by hostile takeovers alone, since the same 
relation exists in countries and time periods in which there is no possibility of a hostile takeover.  
Another possibility is that the relation could occur because of other actions taken by 
blockholders. Most shares of U.S. firms are held by informed, sophisticated institutional 
investors, many of whom have non-negligible stakes. And some outside shareholders pursue 
active and sometimes aggressive strategies — proxy fights and takeover bids in the past, and 
hedge fund activism in the past decade.  
Financial economists have accordingly been increasingly looking at the effects of 
shareholder actions. There have been a number of studies that have examined the effect of public 
pension funds and other institutional investors on the firms in which they invest [see Del Guercio 
and Hawkins (1999), Gillan and Starks (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), as well as Karpoff 
(2001) and Gillan and Starks (2007) for surveys]. In recent years, the most important players in 
the activism landscape have been activist hedge funds. The activities and payoffs of such hedge 
funds, which are willing to make substantial investments in engagement with companies, are the 
subject of recent studies by Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), Greenwood and Schor 
(2009), and Klein and Zur (2009).  
One key question on which research has focused is the effect of activism on profitability 
Are activists producing value for firms and their fellow shareholders? Or are they hurting their 
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proxy fights and takeover bids and have been more recently asked about hedge fund activists. 
The resolution of these questions has important policy implications for debates on the optimal 
scope of shareholder rights in public companies (e.g., Bebchuk, 2005, 2007; Bainbridge, 2006; 
Strine, 2006; Lipton and Savitt, 2007). Whereas a conclusion that activism is beneficial provides 
support for strengthening shareholder rights, the opposite conclusion provides support for 
constraining them. 
Unlike activist shareholders who mounted proxy fights and takeover bids in the past, the 
activist hedge funds that attracted the limelight in the past decade do not commonly seek to 
acquire the company themselves. Instead they try to affect the way in which the company is run 
or to get the company to be acquired by someone else. Importantly, they most commonly contact 
companies privately, so it is difficult to gauge the magnitude of their intervention using publicly-
available data. It also is not clear what the net effect of institutional activism is. Are activists 
producing a collective good, which is still under-provided and whose actions should be 
encouraged? Or are they destroying value at the expense of other investors? [see Kahan and 
Rock (2007) for a survey and discussion of this issue].  
Unfortunately, informal contact between institutional investors and firms is by its nature 
private and difficult to quantify. Consequently, there has historically been only one study of such 
activism: Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) gather a sample of letters between TIAA-
CREF (a large U.S. pension fund) and companies. They find that TIAA-CREF typically does not 
ask firms to make large operational changes but are usually successful at inducing firms to make 
the relatively small changes they ask for (such as having a shareholder vote before adopting 
‘Blank-Check Preferred Stock,’ or having women or minority representatives on their board of 
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(or international) institutions in terms of its activism. 
Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009), a study included in this special issue, utilizes 
privately obtained data from Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension 
Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its U.K. Focus Fund 
(HUKFF) between 1998 and 2004. This fund has been highly involved with activism and also 
has been unusually successful, earning abnormal annual returns net of fees of 4.9%. 
Becht,Franks, Mayer, and Rossi have complete access to the records of all activism by Hermes, 
including private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public 
information. Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi document the way in which Hermes frequently 
seeks and achieves significant changes in the company's strategy, including refocusing on the 
core business and returning cash to shareholders, as well as changes in the executive 
management such as the replacement of the CEO or chairman. These authors estimate that 
around 90% of the abnormal fund returns is due to the activism program.  
Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) is a significant study because it provides a 
window into the nature of ‘behind the scenes’ activism and shows that such activism can be 
important. The study suggests that financial institutions can increase in value not just by buying 
and selling securities strategically, but also by creating value inside of firms by providing 
monitoring services. It provides an example of the way in which it is possible to learn a great 
deal from the details of the actions of a single (particularly interesting) financial institution.  
There are some questions that future research should try to address. If activism produces 
such large returns, why has Hermes not done it on a larger scale? Is the ability to produce such 
results unique to Hermes or a few such players or is it something that has been done, or can be 
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shows raise the question of why more capital does not flow into this work, reducing returns, and 
in the process also possibly reducing slack in the economy. We need to understand better what 
the barriers are to entry if any into activism. Interestingly, large returns from activism do not 
indicate that a system is working well. The fact that activism can generate such large returns 
might indicate that a high level of slack exists prior to activist intervention.  
  It will also be important to understand the extent to which the findings are due to the 
particular legal and institutional features of the U.K. system. As Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 
(2009) note, legal rules in the U.K. give shareholders much more power than U.S. shareholders 
have. Understanding the ways in which the payoffs and effects of activism depend on legal rules 
is an important question for financial economists to investigate.  
  The financial crisis has intensified the ongoing debate about the role that shareholders 
should play in corporate governance. To some, increasing shareholder power and facilitating 
shareholder intervention when necessary is part of the necessary reforms. To others, activism by 
shareholders who potentially have short-term interests is part of the problem, not a solution. To 
what extent (and when) can shareholder activism improve firm value and performance? To what 
extent (and when) can shareholder activism produce distortions that make matters worse? 
Research by financial economists that seeks further light on these questions will provide valuable 
input to the questions with which decision-makers are wrestling.  
 
2. Boards of Directors  
An alternative to direct monitoring by shareholders is governance through the board of directors, 
who are elected by shareholders. Yet, as has been recognized at least since Smith (1776) and 
  6Berle and Means (1932), directors’ interests may not fully overlap with those of shareholders. 
The complex three-way relationship among shareholders, boards, and top management has been 
the subject of a large literature [see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2009) for surveys]. 
  How do we make boards work better? One recipe that has been increasingly suggested by 
public and private decision-makers is to have independent boards [see Gordon (2007) on the rise 
of independent directors]. Indeed, a common policy response to observed ‘governance crises’ has 
been to adopt reforms designed to strengthen the independence of boards. For example, 
following the Enron and WorldCom scandals in 2002, the exchanges increased independence 
requirements, and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 required the independence of audit 
committees. The financial crisis has similarly led to the consideration of legislation aimed at 
bolstering the independence of compensation committees.  
  Why impose regulatory limits on the composition of the board? Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) present a model in which directors imposed on the firm by regulations are likely to be less 
effective than those picked through the endogenous selection process that would occur in the 
absence of regulation. At the same time, regulators are typically concerned that, without 
regulation, opportunism by insiders might lead to insufficient independence of directors.  
Nonetheless, given the growing importance of independent directors, whether due to 
regulation or to choices made by firms, it is important to study empirically the effects of director 
independence. Initial work on the subject failed to find a link between board independence and 
higher firm value (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2002). However, 
there is a growing body of empirical research indicating that director independence is associated 
with improved decisions with respect to some specific types of decisions (e.g., Byrd and 
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Zenner, 1997; Dann, Del Guercio, and Partch, 2003; Gillette, Noe, and Rebello, 2003). In 
particular, it has been shown that director independence has an impact on CEO turnover (e.g., 
Weisbach, 1988), executive compensation decisions (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2008), the incidence of fraud (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney, 1996; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides, 2000), and on the incidence of 
opportunistic timing of stock option grants (e.g., Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2009).
1 
An important, and necessary, condition for directors to be able to be effective is the 
amount and nature of information that they have. If directors only have access to publicly-
available information, it is hard to imagine that they will be able to evaluate management better 
than an outside shareholder. In addition, the mere fact that directors do not have superior 
information would in itself likely be the consequence of a strained relationship with 
management, since presumably no information of value would have been transmitted during 
board meetings. The informational advantage of directors over outsiders thus presumably 
provides a measure of the potential for these directors to add value. 
Ravina and Sapienza (2009), in this special issue, adopt a novel strategy to estimate the 
magnitude of this informational advantage. These authors compare the trading performance of 
independent directors and other officers of the firm. Their interesting finding is that independent 
directors earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock 
and that the difference with the same firm's officers’ personal trading returns is relatively small 
at most horizons. Executive officers and independent directors both earn higher returns in firms 
with the weakest governance. In addition, independent directors who sit on the audit committee 
                                                 
1 Recent work (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2006) also documents that reforms requiring some firms to 
increase their use of independent directors were associated with increases in the firm value of such firms.  
  8earn higher returns than other independent directors at the same firm. Finally, independent 
directors earn significantly higher returns than the market when they sell the company stock in a 
window before bad news and around earnings restatements. The authors view their results as 
consistent with the view that independent directors have an informational advantage over 
outsiders and thus can perform their job well.  
While Ravina and Sapienza (2009) stress the implications of their findings for the ability 
of independent directors to perform their role well, one could also draw inferences from it 
concerning their incentives to do so. In particular, to the extent that independent directors rely on 
management for the receipt of information, independent directors who made larger trading 
profits might have been individuals that were close to management or whose performance of the 
oversight function might have been more favorable to management. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and 
Peyer (2009) find that independent directors have been recipients of opportunistically timed 
stock option grants, and they show that the directors’ benefits from such lucky timing were 
associated with substantial benefits to the CEO. In particular, they find that, for any given firm 
and CEO, the odds of a CEO grant being lucky were significantly higher when the independent 
directors of the firm received grants on the same date; and that director grant events not 
coinciding with awards to executives were more likely to be lucky when the CEO received a 
lucky grant in the same or prior year.  
The Ravina and Sapienza (2009) study, and the other recent works discussed in this 
section, highlight the value of the work by financial economists on independent directors, who 
play a major role in corporate decision-making. Financial economists should not generally 
assume that independent directors seek to maximize shareholder value; rather, the decisions of 
independent directors, like those of other economic agents, might well be influenced by their 
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operate. The information that independent directors have should be similarly recognized to be 
endogenously determined by corporate structures and processes, rather than to be exogenously 
given. Additional work on the incentives and information of independent directors would be 
worthwhile.  
 
3. Executive Compensation 
In the ordinary course of events, public firms are managed by executives, not directors or 
shareholders. Executives’ decisions are influenced by the directors’ oversight, as well as by 
shareholders’ monitoring. Executives’ decisions are also affected, however, by the incentives 
provided to them by their executive compensation arrangements. These compensation 
arrangements have become the subject of a large literature [see Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, 
and Larcker (2003) for surveys].  
There are at least two views of executive compensation in the literature. One view (“the 
optimal contracting view”) sees executive pay arrangements as the product of arm’s length 
contracting between boards and executives, which leads to contracts that provide efficient 
incentives for reducing agency problems as much as possible (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979). An 
alternative view (“the managerial power view”) questions whether pay arrangements are the 
product of arm’s length contracting and sees such pay arrangements as part of the agency 
problem itself rather than as a solution to it (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004).  
One part of the debate on executive compensation concerns compensation levels (Kaplan 
2008). Are the levels of executive compensation, which have grown considerably relative to 
rank-and-file compensation in recent years (Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck, 2004; Bebchuk and 
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they reflect rent-seeking by powerful managers? Given the attention that pay levels receive from 
the media, the public, and policy-makers, a better understanding of the factors affecting them is 
clearly an important research topic.  
The second dimension to the debate concerns the structure of pay arrangements. Under 
the optimal contracting view, the design of pay arrangements is presumed to be (second-best) 
efficient. In contrast, the managerial power view allows for the possibility that pay arrangements 
will be structured sub-optimally in ways that lead to diluted or even perverse incentives. While 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that pay is insufficiently tied to performance due to outside 
social pressures, the managerial power view suggests that sub-optimal pay-performance 
sensitivity could itself be a product of executive influence. To financial economists, the question 
of incentives, and in particular the extent to which incentives provided by pay arrangements 
should be presumed to be optimal, is of significant importance.  
Some recent work by financial economists, including the work by Kaplan and Rauh 
(2009) in this special issue, seeks to explain the growth of executive pay within the arm’s length 
contracting paradigm by suggesting that it reflects an increase in the value of executives’ 
marginal contributions and improvements in their outside options. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) 
suggest that the growth in pay reflects a shift in the importance of "managerial ability" (skills 
transferable across companies) relative to "firm-specific human capital" (valuable only within the 
organization), which operated to strengthen executives’ bargaining position by improving their 
outside options. Gabaix and Landier (2008) develop a model in which the marginal product of an 
executive of a given quality is proportional to the market capitalization of the firm, and argue 
that the growth of pay has been due to the increase in the market capitalization of firms. The 
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questioned on empirical grounds by Dew-Becker and Gordon (2007), Cremers and Grinstein 
(2009), and Frydman and Saks (2009).  
Kaplan and Rauh (2009) examine the question of whether the growth of pay can reflect 
market forces in a creative way. The idea is that if executive pay reflects market forces, then its 
growth should parallel that of other high paid professions. Kaplan and Rauh gather data on 
compensation from high paying fields such as financial service sector employees from 
investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street), as well as 
corporate lawyers, professional athletes, and celebrities.  
The estimates of Kaplan and Rauh (2009) lead them to conclude that non-financial public 
company CEOs and top executives do not represent more than 6.5% of any of the top AGI 
brackets (the top 0.1%, 0.01%, 0.001%, and 0.0001%). Individuals in the Wall Street category 
comprise at least as high a percentage of the top AGI brackets as non-financial executives of 
public companies. Kaplan and Rauh argue that this evidence suggests that the growth of 
executive pay is not reflective of suboptimal contracting, but rather is most consistent with 
theories of superstars, skill biased technological change, greater scale, and the interaction of 
these effects. 
Although Kaplan and Rauh (2009) suggest that the growth of pay levels could be 
consistent with the optimal contracting view, they do not attempt to test directly whether 
compensation is indeed the product of arm’s length contracting. A full defense of this view 
would have to address the empirical evidence that compensation levels are higher (as well as less 
sensitive to performance) when governance is weaker [see Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Chapter 6) 
for a survey]. Among other things, there is evidence that CEO pay is higher when outside 
  12directors serve on multiple boards, when the board has interlocking directors, when more of the 
outside directors have been appointed under this CEO, when there are no large outside 
blockholders, when a smaller percentage of shares is held by institutional investors, and when 
antitakeover protections are more significant (e.g., Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino, 1997; 
Hallock, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Cyert, Kang, and Kumar, 2002; Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003).
2  
Whereas Kaplan and Rauh (2009) defends the optimal contracting view against claims 
that pay levels have been excessive, some other recent work seeks to defend this view against 
claims that compensation structures have been inefficiently designed.. In particular, Edmans, 
Gabaix, and Landier (2009) present a model in which optimal pay lines up closely with empirical 
observations on actual executive compensation. And while many public officials expressed 
concerns that standard pay arrangements provide excessive incentives to focus on the short-term 
[an argument stressed in Bebchuk and Fried (2004, Chapter 14)], Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) 
argue that there is no empirical evidence that such incentives have played a role in the run-up to 
the financial crisis.  
  Although interest in executive pay has been high for quite some time, the Financial Crisis 
of 2008-2009 has further intensified this interest. Public attention to the compensation levels of 
top officials appears to be at an all-time high. Regulators around the world are examining 
measures to improve the structure of compensation, and not to make things worse through ill 
thought out provisions. And authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere are considering measures to 
improve the corporate governance processes that produce pay arrangements. The examination of 
                                                 
2 There is also evidence that weaker corporate governance is associated with lower sensitivity of pay to 
performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and opportunistic compensation practices such as those 
manifested by option backdating (Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2009; Bizjak, Whitby, and Lemmon, 
2009).  
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will be informed from the ongoing and future research of financial economists.  
 
4. Controlling Shareholders  
The nature of governance problems differs greatly between public companies with and without a 
controlling shareholder (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Bebchuk and Hamdani, 
2009). With controlling shareholders, the market for corporate control that plays such an 
important role in the analysis of companies without a controller, cannot provide a source of 
discipline. With a controlling shareholder, the fundamental governance problem is not 
opportunism by executives and directors at the expense of public shareholders at large but rather 
opportunism by the controlling shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
The Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, Ravina and Sapienza, and Kaplan and Rauh papers 
in this issue all focus on companies without a controlling shareholder — the common structure 
among publicly traded firms in the U.S. and the U.K. and the one on which most research has 
focused. But as the work on comparative corporate governance has shown (Becht and Röell, 
1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Franks and Mayer, 2001), companies with 
a controlling shareholder are the dominant form among publicly traded firms in most countries. 
Holderness (2009) shows that controlling shareholders are more common even in the U.S. than is 
usually assumed.  
One important type of controlling shareholders are those labeled “controlling minority 
shareholders” by Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000). These are shareholders who own 
only a minority (and sometimes a small minority) of the company’s cash flow rights but control a 
majority of the votes and thus have a lock on control. An owner of minority of the cash flow 
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the use of dual-class stock, corporate pyramids, or cross-holdings. Such structures are quite 
common in many countries (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) show that such structures have the potential to create 
very large agency costs that are an order of magnitude larger than those associated with 
controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cash flow rights in their companies. 
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) present evidence about the significant amount of 
tunneling that takes place in such firms.  
  In the U.S., controlling minority shareholder structures commonly occur through the use 
of dual-class shares. In such firms, multiple classes of stocks will trade, typically with the same 
dividend rights but different voting rights. This arrangement ensures that control is kept in the 
hands of a small group of individuals, usually the founder and/or his family, even though the 
company can be traded publicly with many shareholders. The wedge between the prices of the 
different classes of stock reflects the private benefits of control enjoyed by the high-vote 
shareholders. There have been a number of papers documenting the patterns of ownership, the 
prices of dual class stocks, and the value of voting rights in such firms both in the U.S. and 
internationally (e.g., Zingales, 1994, 1995; Nenova, 2003). Yet, these studies have typically had 
relatively small samples that limit their ability to answer important questions about dual class 
firms, such as the incremental effect of dual class ownership on valuation. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2009), in this issue, consider the issue of governance when 
cash flow rights and voting rights are separated. They assemble a comprehensive list of dual-
class firms in the U.S. and use this list to investigate the relationship between insider ownership 
and firm value. Their data (which is available at the Review of Financial Studies website) has 
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 First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow 
rights from voting rights, they can separately identify the impact of each. Second, they address 
endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments.  
In single-stage regressions, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2009) find strong evidence that 
firm value is increasing in insiders' cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In 
instrumental-variable regressions, the point estimates remain the same sign and magnitude, but 
the significance levels are lower. This work illustrates the importance of ownership structure for 
valuation. Because of its instrumental variable approach, it has a relatively clean way of 
measuring the impact of controlling shareholders that can appropriate private benefits from 
minority ones.  
The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2009) paper thus makes a contribution to the 
accumulating empirical evidence that controlling minority shareholder structures are associated 
with increased agency costs and reduced firm value. The question then arises why such 
structures develop and are maintained, and what should be the public policy toward them. Given 
the importance of companies with controlling minority shareholders in many countries around 
the world, these questions should be part of the research agenda of financial economists.  
 
5. International Comparisons  
Until the mid-1990s, most of the work on corporate governance has been in the context of U.S. 
firms. But the influential work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002) has stimulated a large 
body of work on international comparisons [see Levine (2005) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008) for surveys].  
  16  Much of this work has focused on differences between countries’ legal systems 
(including their systems of enforcement), and has studied how such differences relate to 
differences in how economies and capital markets perform. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1997, 1998) put forward an anti-director index for measuring the legal protection 
accorded to investors, and this index has been subsequently used by more than one hundred 
studies (Spamann, 2009). How best to measure the extent to which a particular country’s legal 
system protects the rights of public investors is an active area of research in which recent work 
seeks to provide improved indices for this purpose (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2008).  
  While research on comparative corporate governance has in the past mainly focused on 
cross-country differences in governance, a substantial body of research about U.S. firms has been 
showing that cross-firm differences in governance have substantial effect on firm value and 
performance. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) have shown that a governance index (the G-
index) based on 24 provisions is negatively correlated with firm value. Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) point out that six of these provisions fully drive the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick results 
and propose an alternative entrenchment index based on them (the E-index). A particularly 
important component of the G-index and the E-index is whether boards are staggered (Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subramanian, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). A significant number of subsequent 
studies have identified many ways in which the G-index, the E-index, and the existence of 
staggered boards are associated with firm performance and behavior (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie, 2007; Kedia and Philippon, 2008).  
Given the magnitude of firm-level differences in governance, it is a natural next step for 
the literature on international comparisons to try to look beyond cross-country and incorporate 
  17into the investigation firm-level differences. Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), in 
this issue, take this step using a new database of firm-level governance provisions put together 
by RiskMetrics, a global shareholder advisory firm.
3 Bruno and Claessens (2007) and 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007) also use this dataset to investigate the subject.  
With data on both country-level and firm-level governance, an important question 
investigated by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) is how these two types of 
governance choices interact. Does having a good legal system act as a substitute for firm-level 
choices? Or does it facilitate firm-level governance, making the two types of governance 
complements? Theoretically, either is possible, so the question can only be answered by 
examining data on firm and country level governance. 
Given that the U.S. is known for its high economic development and strong investor 
protection, the authors examine whether comparable non-U.S. firms choose higher or lower 
levels of protection than similar U.S. firms. They construct a firm-level governance index that 
increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared to U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% 
of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases 
relative to the index of matching U.S. firms, implying that the governance attributes examined in 
the study are relevant for shareholder value. The authors view these findings as consistent with 
the “complements” view under which lower country-level investor protection make it suboptimal 
for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do.  
As done by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), future research on 
comparative corporate governance should strive to take firm-level governance into account. The 
use of the RiskMetrics dataset for this purpose, however, has some limitations. Bebchuk and 
                                                 
3 At the time of the study, the database was owned by I.S.S. and is consequently referred to as the I.S.S. 
database by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (and other authors). 
  18Hamdani (2009) point out that the RiskMetrics dataset is U.S.-centric in that it focuses on 
features that are important for the companies without controlling shareholder that are dominant 
in the U.S. capital market but not in most other capital markets around the world. Indeed, the 
finding of Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) that firm-level governance is better in 
U.S. firms than in firms from other countries is likely to be at least partially due to the U.S.-
centric nature of the dataset used by this study.  
The Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) analysis suggests a direction that would be worth 
pursuing by work on international comparisons. Much of the work thus far has sought to develop 
and employ a single global governance standard for making either country-level or firm-level 
comparisons around the world. However, governance arrangements that are optimal for investor 
protection in companies without a controlling shareholder could be suboptimal for companies 
with such a controller, and vice versa. Consequently, the quest for a single global governance 
standard should be replaced with separate standards for evaluating governance in firms with and 
without a controlling shareholder. The development and application of such standards is 
potentially an important task for future research.  
 
6. Cross-Border Investing  
A substantial part of the work on international comparisons abstracts from the movement of 
firms and capital across borders. It takes as given that each country has a given set of firms and a 
given amount of capital invested in these firms, and it focuses on how firms in different countries 
vary in how they are governed. In our increasingly globalized world, however, there is in fact 
much movement across borders, and there is some research that seeks to understand the causes 
and consequences of such movement.  
  19One important element of cross-border movements concerns decisions by firms 
headquartered and operating in a given country to subject themselves to the governance rules of 
other countries. Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) have suggested that firms can therefore “bond” 
themselves to good governance by incorporating in another country or by listing on a foreign 
exchange. There is a significant line of work examining why firms “migrate” to foreign 
governance systems and the extent to which such migration is due to a desire by firms to “bond” 
themselves to governance arrangements that provide tighter protection to public investors (Reese 
and Weisbach, 2002; Pagano, Röell, and Zechner, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; 
Siegel, 2005; Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Stulz, and Miller, 2009).
4 
Another important element of global capital markets is cross-border movement of capital. 
In contrast to classical portfolio theory, investors tend to have a “home bias” in favor of 
investing in firms of the investor’s country of residence. Recently, however, investors have been 
increasingly allocating part of their equity investments to foreign companies. As it is natural to 
ask how the migration of firms across borders is influenced by governance considerations, it is 
also natural to ask how cross-border investing flows are influenced by such considerations.  
The level of investor protection is likely to be particularly important for investors 
considering purchasing securities issued by a company from another country. Foreign investors 
tend to have less information about companies they invest in than domestic investors and also 
tend to have fewer political connections, or long-term relationships with the firm that can 
potentially substitute for governance. Under this hypothesis, the quality of governance in a firm 
should be correlated with the foreign stockholders in a company. In particular, since strong 
                                                 
4 This work is naturally related to the substantial literature on regulatory competition among states 
seeking to attract incorporations (Romano, 1985; Bebchuk, 1992; Romano, 1997; Daines, 2001; Bebchuk 
and Hamdani, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Kahan, 2006; Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk, 2006). 
  20governance makes a firm relatively more attractive to foreigners than to domestic investors, 
foreigners should have a higher percentage ownership in firms where investors are better 
protected. 
The study by Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009), in this issue, tests this hypothesis. There 
has been much work documenting that increased disclosure makes a firm more attractive to all 
investors [see Hermalin and Weisbach (2009) and the references therein], and Leuz, Lins, and 
Warnock show that such openness is particularly important in attracting foreign investors. The 
authors study 4,409 firms from 29 countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate 
governance result in fewer foreign holdings. Their results suggest that foreigners invest less in 
firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership 
structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced 
when earnings are opaque, indicating that the information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced 
by foreign investors likely drive the results. 
  The findings of Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) confirm that governance problems 
impede firms’ ability to attract capital from foreign investors even more than it impedes their 
ability to raise capital domestically. Poor governance can thus limit capital flows and the 
integration of capital markets in the global economy. These findings are especially important 
given that some of the countries whose investor protection is especially weak are also those 
countries for whom capital investment from abroad is especially significant. Thus, governance 
reforms in such countries might produce considerable benefits for their economies. Whether such 
reforms will in fact occur depends in part on the political economy of governance reforms, which 
is the subject of the next section.  
 
  217. Politics  
Corporate governance is in part a product of legal systems put in place and the legal 
infrastructure accompanying them. And throughout the earlier discussion we have talked about 
the potential significance of differences among systems of corporate governance in different 
countries. Such systems differ considerably around the world and, for any given country, over 
time.  
There is a lot of research that either takes the legal rules as given and examines how 
agents make choices given them, or asks what legal arrangements are desirable assuming that 
public officials generally seek to adopt whatever rules are optimal. But why then would countries 
that are in a similar stage of their economic development have legal rules that are so different 
and why do so many countries persist in having systems that seem to provide patently 
insufficient legal protection to public investors?  
One important strand seeks to relate cross-country differences to some innate, long-
standing differences among countries. This line of work suggests that a country's level of 
investor protection may be influenced by long-standing factors such as the country's legal origin 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008), its culture and ideology (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Roe, 
2003; Allen, 2005), or the religion of its population (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), all of which 
lie outside the realm of current political choices.  
But given that countries do change their investor protection arrangements considerably 
over time, the level of such protection at any given point in time may also result at least partly 
from recent decisions by public officials. And the question is how these decisions are 
determined. The theory of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971) suggests that the decisions by public 
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interest groups. What can be said about the way in which interest group politics is played out in 
the area of corporate governance politics? In a recent Journal of Economic Literature survey, 
Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) stress the importance of developing formal political 
economy models of corporate governance arrangements and view this task as “a fascinating 
uncharted territory for creative theorists.”  
Bebchuk and Neeman (2009), in this issue, try to help fill this void and develop a formal 
political economy model of how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor 
protection. In their model, three groups — insiders in existing public companies, institutional 
investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the 
future — compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. The 
authors identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium 
level of investor protection.  
Factors pushing investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of 
corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, and the 
inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would 
produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in 
raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from 
insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital that public firms already possess. The 
entrepreneurs prefer an efficient level of investor protection, and their introduction into the 
Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) model therefore moderates, but is shown not to eliminate, the bias 
in favor of excessive private benefits of control. While entrepreneurs do internalize the interests 
of those public investors who buy IPO shares when they take their firms public, they do not 
  23internalize, and neither does anyone else at the lobbying table, the interests of individuals who 
directly or indirectly hold shares in existing public firms and who are not at the table.  
The essential point is that, in an economy with existing public firms, choices of investor 
protection levels affect not only the allocation of cash flows from the capital to be raised from 
public investors in the future but also the allocation of rents from the capital that public firms 
already have (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). When those lobbying on behalf of insiders and outside 
shareholders do not fully internalize the costs and benefits of their choices on outside investors, 
the fight over these rents produces suboptimal investor protection levels even in the presence of 
entrepreneurs lobbying for efficient rules. 
The insights generated by the Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) model complements those 
developed by Rajan and Zingales (2003, 2004) and Perotti and Volpin (2008), who argue that 
incumbent firms seeking to retain market power lobby for weak investor protection that would 
make it difficult for other firms to raise capital to enter. Bebchuk and Neeman focus on another 
conflict among interest groups — the struggle between public firms’ corporate insiders, who 
seek to extract rent from the capital under their control, and the outside investors who provided 
them with capital.
5 
One important pattern established by the evidence is the positive correlation between 
high levels of investor protection and good economic outcomes such as well-developed stock 
                                                 
5 Note that both the Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) and the Rajan, Zingales, Perotti, and Volpin (2009) line 
of work focus on lobbying by interest groups, in contrast to earlier work that has focused on how investor 
protection is shaped by the citizens’ voting decisions and the preferences of the median voter (e.g., 
Pagano and Volpin ,2005a, 2005b; Perotti and Von-Thadden, 2006). Bebchuk and Neeman argue that, in 
the ordinary course of events, most corporate issues are intensely followed by the interest groups with 
sufficient stake and expertise but are not sufficiently understood and salient to most citizens. But they 
recognize that the ordinary pro-insider operation of interest group politics can sometimes be interrupted 
by pro-investor reforms resulting from corporate scandals or a stock market crash that makes voters more 
attentive to corporate governance problems, and they allow for this possibility in their model.  
 
  24markets and higher levels of economic growth (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1998, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). One possible interpretation 
of this correlation is that higher levels of investor protection bring about such good economic 
outcomes. The results generated by the Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) model indicate, however, 
that some of the causality may go in the opposite direction: a high level of investor protection 
may be, at least partly, the product — rather than the cause — of high economic growth, a 
developed stock market, or an advanced-stage economy.  
The model provides predictions relating differences in investor protection (both over time 
and around the world) to the structure of political and legal decision-making, the developmental 
stage of the economy, the corporate structures dominant in the economy, as well as to scandal 
waves and stock market crashes. While some of these results can help explain patterns identified 
by a number of existing empirical studies, it also provides new predictions that future empirical 
work may seek to test.  
More generally, to improve the understanding of existing governance arrangements and 
how they could be improved, it is important for future work to take into account and study how 
such arrangements are influenced by interest group politics and how it can impede governance 
reforms. The framework offered by the Bebchuk and Neeman (2009) model might be helpful for 
such work.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This issue of The Review of Financial Studies contains seven papers that were presented in a 
meeting of the NBER’s corporate governance project. Each of the papers makes a significant 
contribution to an important area of corporate governance. For each of these areas, we discuss its 
  25importance and current state of research, how the paper in this special issue makes a 
contribution, and some of the work that remains to be done. We hope that the papers in the 
special issue, and the additional work that will follow, will advance our understanding about 
these important areas.  
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